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Summary
After the U.S. Supreme Court held that U.S. courts have jurisdiction pursuant
to 28 U.S.C. § 2241 to hear legal challenges on behalf of persons detained at the U.S.
Naval Station in Guantanamo Bay, Cuba, in connection with the war against
terrorism (Rasul v. Bush), the Pentagon established administrative hearings, called
“Combatant Status Review Tribunals” (CSRTs), to allow the detainees to contest
their status as enemy combatants, and informed them of their right to pursue relief
in federal court by seeking a writ of habeas corpus.  Lawyers subsequently filed
dozens of petitions on behalf of the detainees in the District Court for the District of
Columbia, where judges have reached inconsistent conclusions as to whether the
detainees have any enforceable rights to challenge their treatment and detention.
In January 2006, Congress stepped into the fray, passing the Detainee Treatment
Act of 2005 (DTA) to require uniform standards for interrogation of persons in the
custody of the Department of Defense, and expressly to ban cruel, inhuman, or
degrading treatment of detainees in the custody of any U.S. agency anywhere
overseas. The DTA also divested the courts of jurisdiction to hear some detainees’
challenges by eliminating the federal courts’ statutory jurisdiction over habeas claims
by aliens detained at Guantanamo Bay as well as other causes of action based on their
treatment or living conditions.  The DTA provides instead for limited appeals of
CSRT determinations or final decisions of military commissions. 
In Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, the Supreme Court rejected the view that the DTA left
it without jurisdiction to review a habeas challenge to the validity of military
commissions established by President Bush to try suspected terrorists.  In holding the
military commissions invalid, the Court did not revisit its 2004 opinion in Hamdi v.
Rumsfeld upholding the President’s authority to detain individuals in connection with
antiterrorism operations, and did not resolve whether the petitioner could claim
prisoner-of-war (POW) status, but held that “in undertaking to try Hamdan and
subject him to criminal punishment, the Executive is bound to comply with the Rule
of Law that prevails in this jurisdiction.”
The Court’s decision has led to efforts in Congress to enact legislation
authorizing the President to convene military commissions.  The proposed legislation
(H.R. 6054, H.R. 6166, S. 3901, S. 3930, S. 3861, and S. 3886) would also amend
the DTA to further reduce the access of aliens in U.S. custody overseas to federal
court, to the extent that such jurisdiction existed, by eliminating pending and future
causes of action other than the limited review of military proceedings permitted
under the DTA.  Implementation of the DTA, in its present form or as proposed to
be amended, to preclude the detainees’ access to court may raise constitutional issues
with respect to the Suspension Clause (U.S. Const. Art. 1, § 9, cl. 2), whether it
amounts to an impermissible “court-stripping” measure to deprive the Supreme Court
of jurisdiction over matters of law entrusted to it by the Constitution, and whether
such constitutionally sensitive issues can be avoided in light of the alternative
procedures provided. This report will be updated as events warrant.
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1 542 U.S. 466 (2004).
Enemy Combatant Detainees: Habeas
Corpus Challenges in Federal Court
In Rasul v. Bush,1 a divided Supreme Court declared that “a state of war is not
a blank check for the president”and ruled that persons deemed “enemy combatants”
have the right to challenge their detention before a judge or other “neutral
decision-maker.” The decision reversed the holding of the Court of Appeals for the
District of Columbia Circuit, which had agreed with the Bush Administration that no
U.S. court has jurisdiction to hear petitions for habeas corpus by or on behalf of the
detainees because they are aliens and are detained outside the sovereign territory of
the United States.  Lawyers have filed dozens of petitions on behalf of the detainees
in the District Court for the District of Columbia, where judges have reached
conflicting conclusions as to whether the detainees have any enforceable rights to
challenge their treatment and detention.  
After the Supreme Court granted certiorari to hear a challenge by one of the
detainees to his trial by military tribunal, Congress passed the Detainee Treatment
Act of 2005 (DTA).  The DTA requires uniform standards for interrogation of
persons in the custody of the Department of Defense, and expressly bans cruel,
inhuman, or degrading treatment of detainees in the custody of any U.S. agency.  At
the same time, however, it divest the courts of jurisdiction to hear challenges by those
detained at Guantanamo Bay based on their treatment or living conditions. The DTA
also includes a modified version of the Graham Amendment (S.Amdt. 2516 to S.
1042, “the Graham-Levin Amendment”), which eliminates the federal courts’
statutory jurisdiction over habeas claims by aliens challenging their detention at
Guantanamo Bay, but provides for limited appeals of status determinations made
pursuant to the DoD procedures for Combatant Status Review Tribunals (CSRTs) or
by military commissions.  Implementation of the Act could raise constitutional issues
with respect to the Suspension Clause (U.S. Const. Art. 1, § 9, cl. 2), whether it
amounts to an impermissible “court-stripping” measure to deprive the Supreme Court
of jurisdiction over matters of law entrusted to it by the Constitution, and whether
such constitutionally sensitive issues can be avoided in light of available alternative
procedures. 
In Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, decided June 29, 2006, the Supreme Court rejected the
government’s argument that the DTA divested it of jurisdiction to hear the case, and
reviewed the validity of military commissions established to try suspected terrorists
of violations of the law of war, pursuant to President Bush’s military order.  The
Court did not revisit its 2004 opinion in Hamdi v. Rumsfeld upholding the President’s
authority to detain individuals in connection with antiterrorism operations, and did
not resolve whether the petitioner could claim prisoner-of-war (POW) status, but held
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2  The two most relevant conventions are the Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment
of Prisoners of War, August 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3317 (hereinafter “GPW”); Geneva
Convention Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War, Aug. 12, 1949,
6 U.S.T. 3516 (hereinafter “GC”).
3 White House Memorandum, “Humane Treatment of al Qaeda and Taliban Detainees”
(Feb. 7, 2002), available at  [http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-srv/nation/documents/
020702bush.pdf].
4 For more history and analysis, see CRS Report RL31367, Treatment of ‘Battlefield
Detainees’ in the War on Terrorism, by Jennifer K. Elsea.
5 Order on Detention, Treatment, and Trial of Certain Non-Citizens in the War against
Terrorism, November 13, 2001, 66 Fed.Reg. 57,833 (2000)(hereinafter “MO” or “military
order”).
6 For an analysis of the military commission rules, see CRS Report RL31600, The
Department of Defense Rules for Military Commissions: Analysis of Procedural Rules and
Comparison with Proposed Legislation and the Uniform Code of Military Justice, by
Jennifer Elsea.
7 10 U.S.C. § 801 et seq.
8  542 U.S. 466 (2004).
that “in undertaking to try Hamdan and subject him to criminal punishment, the
Executive is bound to comply with the Rule of Law that prevails in this jurisdiction.”
This report provides an overview of the CSRT procedures, summarizes court
cases related to the detentions and the use of military commissions, and summarizes
the Detainee Treatment Act, analyzing how it might affect detainee-related litigation
in federal court. 
Background
The White House determined in February 2002 that Taliban detainees are
covered under the Geneva Conventions,2 while Al Qaeda detainees are not,3 but that
none of the detainees qualifies for the status of  prisoner of war (POW).4  The
Administration deemed all of them to be “unlawful enemy combatants,” who may be
held without trial or even if they are acquitted by a military tribunal.  Twenty of the
detainees have been determined by the President to be subject to his military order
(“MO”) of November 13, 2001,5 making them eligible for trial by military
commission.6  The Supreme Court found that the procedural rules established by the
Department of Defense to govern the military commissions were not established in
accordance with the Uniform Code of Military Justice (UCMJ).7  
Rasul v. Bush8
 Petitioners were two Australians and twelve Kuwaitis (a petition on behalf of
two U.K. citizens was mooted by their release) who were captured during hostilities
in Afghanistan and are being held in military custody at the Guantanamo Bay Naval
Base, Cuba.  The Administration argued, and the court below had agreed, that under
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9 Rasul at 478-79.  When Eisentrager was decided in 1950, the Rasul majority found, the
“respective jurisdictions” of federal district courts were understood to extend no farther than
the geographical boundaries of the districts (citing Ahrens v. Clark, 335 U.S. 188 (1948)).
According to the Court, that understanding was altered by a line of cases recognized in
Braden v. 30th Judicial Circuit Court of Ky., 410 U.S. 484 (1973), as overruling the
statutory interpretation that had established the “inflexible jurisdictional rule” upon which
Eisentrager was implicitly based.  Justice Scalia, with Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justice
Thomas, dissented, arguing that the habeas statute on its face requires a federal district court
with territorial jurisdiction over the detainee.  The dissenters would have read Braden as
distinguishing Ahrens rather than overruling it.  For more analysis of the Rasul opinion, see
CRS Report RS21884, [THIS HAS A NEW TITLE] The Supreme Court and Detainees in
the War on Terrorism: Summary and Analysis, by Jennifer K. Elsea.
10 Rasul at 475 (citing Eisentrager at 777).
the 1950 Supreme Court case Johnson v. Eisentrager (339 U.S. 763), “‘the privilege
of litigation’ does not extend to aliens in military custody who have no presence in
‘any territory over which the United States is sovereign.’” The Court distinguished
Rasul by noting that Eisentrager concerned the constitutional right to habeas corpus
rather than the right as implemented by statute.  The Rasul Court did not reach the
constitutional issue, but found authority for federal court jurisdiction in 28 U.S.C.
§ 2241, which grants courts the authority to hear applications for habeas corpus
“within their respective jurisdictions,” by any person who claims to be held “in
custody in violation of the Constitution or laws or treaties of the United States.”9
The Court also declined to read the statute to vary its geographical scope
according to the citizenship of the detainee.  Justice Kennedy, in a concurring
opinion, would have found jurisdiction over the Guantanamo detainees based on the
facts that Guantanamo is effectively a U.S. territory and is “far removed from any
hostilities,” and that the detainees are “being held indefinitely without the benefit of
any legal proceeding to determine their status.” Noting that the Writ of Habeas
Corpus (“Writ”) has evolved as the primary means to challenge executive detentions,
especially those without trial, the Court held that jurisdiction over habeas petitions
does not turn on sovereignty over the territory where detainees are held.  Even if the
habeas statute were presumed not to extend extraterritorially, as the government
urged, the Court found that the “complete jurisdiction and control” the United States
exercises under its lease with Cuba would suffice to bring the detainees within the
territorial and historical scope of the Writ. 
Without expressly overruling Eisentrager, the Court distinguished the cases at
issue to find Eisentrager inapplicable.  Eisentrager listed six factors that precluded
those petitioners from seeking habeas relief: each petitioner “(a) is an enemy alien;
(b) has never been or resided in the United States; (c) was captured outside of our
territory and there held in military custody as a prisoner of war; (d) was tried and
convicted by a Military Commission sitting outside the United States; (e) for offenses
against laws of war committed outside the United States; (f) and is at all times
imprisoned outside the United States.”10  The Rasul Court noted that the Guantanamo
petitioners, in contrast “are not nationals of countries at war with the United States,
and they deny that they have engaged in or plotted acts of aggression against the
United States; they have never been afforded access to any tribunal, much less
charged with and convicted of wrongdoing; and for more than two years they have
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11 28 U.S.C. § 1331(“The district courts shall have original jurisdiction of all civil actions
arising under the Constitution, laws, or treaties of the United States.”).
12 28 U.S.C. § 1350 (“The district courts shall have original jurisdiction of any civil action
by an alien for a tort only, committed in violation of the law of nations or a treaty of the
United States.”).
13 Rasul at 484 (“nothing in Eisentrager or in any of our other cases categorically excludes
aliens detained in military custody outside the United States from the ‘privilege of litigation’
in U.S. courts”).
14 The Court noted that “Eisentrager made quite clear that all six of the facts critical to its
disposition were relevant only to the question of the prisoners’ constitutional entitlement
to habeas corpus.” Rasul at 476 (emphasis original).
15 Hamdan v.  Rumsfeld, 126 S.Ct. 2749, 2793 (2006)(characterizing the Eisentrager
decision, 339 U.S. 763, 790(1950), as having rejected the treaty claim “on the merits”).
been imprisoned in territory over which the United States exercises exclusive
jurisdiction and control.”  
As to the petitioners’ claims based on statutes other than the habeas statute,
which included the federal question statute11 as well as the Alien Tort Statute,12 the
Court applied the same reasoning to conclude that nothing precluded the detainees
from bringing such claims before a federal court.13
The Court’s opinion left many questions unanswered.  It is unclear which of the
Eisentrager (or Rasul) factors would control under a different set of facts.14  The
opinion does not address whether persons detained by the U.S. military abroad in
locations where the United States does not exercise full jurisdiction and control
would have access to U.S. courts.  However, the Hamdan opinion seems to indicate
that a majority of the Court regards Eisentrager as a ruling denying relief on the
merits rather than a ruling precluding jurisdiction altogether.15  Under this view, it
may be argued, there was no statutory bar precluding detainees in U.S. custody
overseas from petitioning for habeas relief in U.S. courts.
The Court did not decide the merits of the petitions, although in a footnote the
majority opined that “Petitioners’ allegations — that, although they have engaged
neither in combat nor in acts of terrorism against the United States, they have been
held in Executive detention for more than two years in territory subject to the
long-term, exclusive jurisdiction and control of the United States, without access to
counsel and without being charged with any wrongdoing — unquestionably describe
‘custody in violation of the Constitution or laws or treaties of the United States.’”
The opinion left to lower courts such issues as whether the detentions are authorized
by Congress, who may be detained and what evidence might be adduced to determine
whether a person is an enemy combatant, or whether the Geneva Conventions afford
the detainees any protections.   The Court did not address the extent to which
Congress might alter federal court jurisdiction over detainees’ habeas petitions, an
issue which is discussed more fully below.
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16 See Department of Defense (DoD) Fact Sheet, “Combatant Status Review Tribunals,”
available at [http://www.defenselink.mil/news/Jul2004/d20040707factsheet.pdf].  CSRT
proceedings are modeled on the procedures of Army Regulation (AR) 190-8, Enemy
Prisoners of War, Retained Personnel, Civilian Internees and Other Detainees (1997), which
establishes administrative procedures to determine the status of detainees under the Geneva
Conventions and prescribes their treatment in accordance with international law.  It does not
include a category for “unlawful” or “enemy” combatants, who would presumably be
covered by the other categories. 
17 See DoD Press Release, “Combatant Status Review Tribunal Order Issued” (June 7,
2004), available at [http://www.defenselink.mil/releases/2004/nr20040707-0992.html].
18 Witnesses from within the U.S. Armed Forces are not “reasonably available” if their
participation, as determined by their commanders, would adversely affect combat or support
operations.  All other witnesses, apparently including those from other agencies, are not
“reasonably available” if they decline to attend or cannot be reached, or if security
considerations prevents their presence.  It is unclear who makes the security determination.
Non-government witnesses appear at their own expense.  Testimony is under oath and may
be provided in writing or by telephone or video.
Combatant Status Review Tribunals  
In response to Supreme Court decisions in 2004 related to “enemy combatants,”
the Pentagon established procedures for Combatant Status Review Tribunals
(CSRTs), based on the procedures the Army uses to determine POW status during
traditional wars.16  Detainees who are determined not to be enemy combatants are to
be transferred to their country of citizenship or otherwise dealt with “consistent with
domestic and international obligations and U.S. foreign policy.”17  CSRTs have been
completed for all detainees, and have confirmed the status of 520 enemy combatants.
Presumably, any new detainees that might be transported to Guantanamo Bay will go
before a CSRT.
The tribunals are administrative rather than adversarial, but each detainee has
an opportunity to present “reasonably available” evidence and witnesses18 to a panel
of three commissioned officers to try to demonstrate that the detainee does not meet
the criteria to be designated as an “enemy combatant,” defined as “an individual who
was part of or supporting Taliban or al Qaida forces, or associated forces that are
engaged in hostilities against the United States or its coalition partners[,]
...[including] any person who has committed a belligerent act or has directly
supported hostilities in aid of enemy armed forces.” Each detainee is represented by
a military officer (not a member of the Judge Advocate General Corps) and may elect
to participate in the hearing or remain silent. 
The CSRTs are not bound by the rules of evidence that would apply in court,
and the government’s evidence is presumed to be “genuine and accurate.”  The
government is required to present all of its relevant evidence, including evidence that
tends to negate the detainee’s designation, to the tribunal.  Unclassified summaries
of relevant evidence may be provided to the detainee.  The detainee’s personal
representative may view classified information and comment on it to the tribunal to
aid in its determination but does not act as an advocate for the detainee.  If the
tribunal determines that the preponderance of the evidence is insufficient to support
CRS-6
19 See DoD Press Release, “DoD Announces Draft Detainee Review Policy” (March 3,
2004), available at [http://www.defenselink.mil/releases/2004/nr20040303-0403.html].
20 339 U.S. 763 (1950) (holding that the federal courts did not have jurisdiction to hear a
petition on behalf of German citizens who had been convicted by U.S. military commissions
in China because the writ of habeas corpus was not available to “enemy alien[s], who at no
relevant time and in no stage of [their] captivity [have] been within [the court’s]
jurisdiction”).
21 Khalid v. Bush, 355 F.Supp.2d 311 (D. D.C. 2005).
22 Al Odah v. United States, 346 F.Supp.2d 1 (D.D.C. 2004).
23 Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 344 F.Supp.2d 152 (D. D.C. 2004), rev’d 415 F.3d  33 (D.C. Cir.),
rev’d  548 U.S. __ (2006).
24 355 F.Supp.2d 311 (D. D.C. 2005).
a continued designation as “enemy combatant” and its recommendation is approved
through the chain of command, the detainee will be informed of that decision upon
finalization of transportation arrangements (or earlier, if the task force commander
deems it appropriate).
In March 2002, the Pentagon announced plans to create a separate process for
periodically reviewing the status of detainees.19  The process, similar to the CSRT
process, affords persons detained at Guantánamo Bay the opportunity to present to
a review board, on at least an annual basis while hostilities are ongoing, information
to show that the detainee is no longer a threat or that it is in the interest of the United
States and its allies to release the prisoner.  The detainee’s State of nationality may
be allowed, national security concerns permitting, to submit information on behalf
of its national. 
Court Challenges to the Detention Policy
 
While the Supreme Court clarified that the detainees have at least statutory
recourse to federal courts to challenge their detention, the extent to which they may
enforce any rights they may have under the Geneva Conventions and other law
remains unclear.  The Justice Department argues that Rasul v. Bush merely decided
the issue of jurisdiction, but that the 1950 Supreme Court decision in Johnson v.
Eisentrager20 remains applicable to limit the relief to which the detainees are entitled.
While one district judge from the D.C. Circuit agreed,21 others have not, holding for
example that detainees have the right to the assistance of an attorney.22 One judge
found that a detainee has the right to be treated as a POW until a “competent
tribunal” decides otherwise,23 but the appellate court reversed.  The following
sections summarize the three most important decisions, including the first case to
reach the Supreme Court, Hamdan v.  Rumsfeld.
Khalid v. Bush24  
Seven detainees, all of whom had been captured outside of Afghanistan, sought
relief from their detention at the Guantanamo Bay facility.  U.S. District Judge
CRS-7
25 Authorization for Use of Military Force (“the AUMF”), P.L. 107-40, 115 Stat. 224 (2001).
26 Although the MO states that it authorizes detention as well as trial by military
commissions, only fifteen of the detainees have been formally designated as subject to the
MO.
27 355 F.Supp.2d at 314.
28 Id. at 320.
29 Id. at 318.
The President’s ability to make the decisions necessary to effectively prosecute a
Congressionally authorized armed conflict must be interpreted expansively.  Indeed, the
Constitution does not delegate to Congress the power to “conduct” or to “make” war;
rather, Congress has been given the power to “declare” war.  This critical distinction lends
considerable support to the President’s authority to make the operational and tactical
decisions necessary during an ongoing conflict.  Moreover, there can be no doubt that the
President’s power to act at a time of armed conflict is at its strongest when Congress has
specifically authorized the President to act.
30 Id. at 326.
31 Id. at 327.  It may be argued that the habeas statute itself (28 U.S.C. § 2241), which
authorizes challenges of detention based on treaty violations, provides a means for private
enforcement.  See Eisentrager at 339 U.S. at 789 (while noting that the 1929 Geneva
Convention did not provide for private enforcement, considering but rejecting the habeas
claim that the treaty vitiated jurisdiction of military commission).
Richard J. Leon agreed with the Administration  that Congress, in its Authorization
to Use Military Force (AUMF),25 granted President Bush the authority to detain
foreign enemy combatants outside the United States for the duration of the war
against al Qaeda and the Taliban, and that the courts have virtually no power to
review the conditions under which such prisoners are held. Noting that the prisoners
had been captured and detained pursuant to the President’s military order,26 Judge
Leon agreed with the government that “(1) non-resident aliens detained under [such]
circumstances have no rights under the Constitution;  (2) no existing federal law
renders their custody unlawful;  (3) no legally binding treaty is applicable;  and (4)
international law is not binding under these circumstances.”27
Judge Leon rejected the petitioners’ contention that their arrest outside of
Afghanistan and away from any active battlefield meant that they could not be
“enemy combatants” within the meaning of the law of war, finding instead that the
AUMF contains no geographical boundaries,28 and gives the President virtually
unlimited authority to exercise his war power wherever enemy combatants are
found.29  The circumstances behind the off-battlefield captures did, however,
apparently preclude the petitioners from claiming their detentions violate the Geneva
Conventions.30   Other treaties put forth by the petitioners were found to be
unavailing because of their non-self-executing nature.31  
The court declined to evaluate whether the conditions of detention were
unlawful.  Judge Leon concluded that “[w]hile a state of war does not give the
President a ‘blank check,’ and the courts must have some role when individual liberty
is at stake, any role must be limited when, as here, there is an ongoing armed conflict
CRS-8
32 Id. at 330 (citations omitted). 
33 355 F.Supp.2d 443 (D. D.C. 2005).
34 Id. at 465 (citing Hamdi v. Rumsfeld).
and the individuals challenging their detention are non-resident aliens.”32  He
dismissed all seven petitions, ruling that “until Congress and the President act
further, there is . . . no viable legal theory under international law by which a federal
court could issue a writ.”  
In re Guantanamo Detainee Cases33  
U.S. District Judge Joyce Hens Green interpreted Rasul more broadly, finding
that the detainees do have rights under the U.S. Constitution and international
treaties, and thus denied the government’s motion to dismiss the eleven challenges
before the court.  Specifically, Judge Green held that the detainees are entitled to due
process of law under the Fifth Amendment, and that the CSRT procedures do not
meet that standard.  Interpreting the history of Supreme Court rulings on the
availability of constitutional rights in territories under the control of the American
government (though not part of its sovereign territory), Judge Green concluded that
the inquiry turns on the fundamental nature of the constitutional rights being asserted
rather than the citizenship of the person asserting them.  Accepting that the right not
to be deprived of liberty without due process of law is a fundamental constitutional
right, the judge applied a balancing test to determine what process is due in light of
the government’s significant interest in safeguarding national security.34  Judge Green
rejected the government’s stance that the CSRTs provided more than sufficient due
process for the detainees.  Instead, she identified two categories of defects.  She
objected to the CSRTs’ failure to provide the detainees with access to material
evidence upon which the tribunal affirmed their “enemy combatant” status and the
failure to permit the assistance of counsel to compensate for the lack of access.
These circumstances, she said, deprived detainees of a meaningful opportunity to
challenge the evidence against them.  
Second, in particular cases, the judge found that the CSRTs’ handling of
accusations of torture and the vague and potentially overbroad definition of “enemy
combatant” could violate the due process rights of detainees.  Citing detainees’
statements and news reports of abuse, Judge Green noted that the possibility that
evidence was obtained involuntarily from the accused or from other witnesses,
whether by interrogators at Guantanamo or by foreign intelligence officials
elsewhere, could make such evidence unreliable and thus constitutionally
inadmissible as a basis on which to determine whether a detainee is an enemy
combatant.  Judge Green objected to the definition of “enemy combatant” because
it appears to cover “individuals who never committed a belligerent act or who never
directly supported hostilities against the U.S. or its allies.”  She noted that
government counsel had, in response to a set of hypothetical questions, stated that the
following could be treated as enemy combatants under the AUMF: “[a] little old lady
in Switzerland who writes checks to what she thinks is a charity that helps orphans
in Afghanistan but [what] really is a front to finance al-Qaeda activities, a person
who teaches English to the son of an al Qaeda member, and a journalist who knows
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35 Id. at 475 (internal citations omitted).
36 Id. at 476.
37 344 F.Supp.2d 152 (D. D.C. 2004), 415 F.3d  33 (D.C. Cir. 2005), rev’d 548 U.S. __ (2006).
38 10 U.S.C. §§ 801 et seq.
39 There are four Conventions, the most relevant of which is The Geneva Convention
Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War, August 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3317 (hereinafter
“GPW”).
40 344 F.Supp.2d at 161.
41  GPW art. 3.  For a discussion of Common Article 3, see CRS Report RL31367, Treatment
of  “Battlefield Detainees” in the War on Terrorism, by Jennifer K. Elsea.
the location of Osama Bin Laden but refuses to disclose it to protect her source.”35
Judge Green stated that the indefinite detention of a person solely because of his
contacts with individuals or organizations tied to terrorism, and not due to any direct
involvement in terrorist activities, would violate due process even if such detention
were found to be authorized by the AUMF.36
The D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals was considering the government’s appeal
with respect to the holding that the detainees have enforceable rights under the
Constitution and international law, as well as  appeals by some detainees with respect
to other aspects of Judge Green’s decision.  Oral arguments were heard September
8, 2005 on this case as well as the detainees’ appeal of the Khalid decision, supra.
However, the cases were stayed pending the Supreme Court’s review of Hamdan v.
Rumsfeld and are currently under consideration at the district court level.
Hamdan v. Rumsfeld
Salim Ahmed Hamdan, who was captured in Afghanistan and is alleged to have
worked for Osama Bin Laden as a bodyguard and driver, brought this challenge to
the lawfulness of the Secretary of Defense’s plan to try him for alleged war crimes
before a military commission,37 arguing that the military commission rules and
procedures were inconsistent with the UCMJ38 and that he had the right to be treated
as a prisoner of war under the Geneva Conventions.39  U.S. District Judge Robertson
agreed, finding no inherent authority in the President as Commander-in-Chief of the
Armed Forces to create such tribunals outside of the existing statutory authority, with
which the military commission rules did not comply.  He also concluded that the
Geneva Conventions apply to the whole of the conflict in Afghanistan, including
under their protections all persons detained in connection with the hostilities there,40
and that Hamdan was thus entitled to be treated as a prisoner of war until his status
was determined to be otherwise by a competent tribunal, in accordance with article
5 of the Third Geneva Convention (prisoners of war).
The D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals reversed, ruling that the Geneva Conventions
are not judicially enforceable.  Judge Williams wrote a concurring opinion,
construing Common Article 3 to apply to any conflict with a non-state actor,41
without regard to the geographical confinement of such a conflict within the borders
of a signatory state.  The Circuit Court interpreted the UCMJ language to mean that
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consider … an application for … habeas corpus filed by … an alien detained … at
Guantanamo Bay.”  The provision was not yet law when the appellate court decided against
the petitioner, Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 415 F.3d  33 (D.C. Cir. 2005), rev’d 548 U.S. __ (2006).
At issue was whether this provision applies to pending cases.   The Court found that the
provision does not apply to Hamdan’s petition, but did not resolve whether it affects other
cases that fall under the DTA’s provisions regarding final review of Combatant Status
Review Tribunals.  Slip op. at 19, and n.14. 
43 Id. at 7.  To resolve the question, the majority employed canons of statutory interpretation
supplemented by legislative history, avoiding the question of whether the withdrawal of the
Court’s jurisdiction would constitute a suspension of the Writ of Habeas Corpus, or whether
it would amount to impermissible “court-stripping.”  Justice Scalia, joined by Justices Alito
and Thomas in his dissent, interpreted the DTA as a revocation of jurisdiction.
44 Id. at 20. The court below had also rejected this argument, 413 F.3d 33, 36 (D.C. Cir.
2005).
45 See Hamdan, slip op. at 23 (stating that the bodies established by the Department of
Defense to review the decisions of military commissions “clearly lack the structural
insulation from military influence that characterizes the Court of Appeals for the Armed
Forces....”).
46 10 U.S.C. § 821 (“The provisions of [the UCMJ] conferring jurisdiction upon
courts-martial do not deprive military commissions, provost courts, or other military
tribunals of concurrent jurisdiction with respect to offenders or offenses that by statute or
by the law of war may be tried by military commissions, provost courts, or other military
tribunals.”)
military commission rules have only to be consistent with those articles of the UCMJ
that refer specifically to military commissions, and therefore need not be uniform
with the rules that apply to courts-martial.  The Supreme Court granted review and
reversed.
Jurisdiction.  Before reaching the merits of the case, the Supreme Court
declined to accept the government’s argument that Congress, by passing the Detainee
Treatment Act of 2005 (DTA),42 had stripped the Court of its jurisdiction to review
habeas corpus challenges by or on behalf of Guantanamo detainees whose petitions
had already been filed.43  The Court also declined to dismiss the appeal as urged by
the government on the basis that federal courts should abstain from intervening in
cases before military tribunals that have not been finally decided,44 noting the
dissimilarities between military commission trials and ordinary courts-martial of
service members pursuant to procedures established by Congress.45  The
government’s argument that the petitioner had no rights conferred by the Geneva
Conventions that could be adjudicated in federal court likewise did not persuade the
Court to dismiss the case.  Regardless of whether the Geneva Conventions provide
rights enforceable in Article III courts, the Court found that Congress, by
incorporating the “law of war” into UCMJ article 21,46 brought the Geneva
Conventions within the scope of law to be applied by courts.  Justice Scalia, joined
by Justices Thomas and Alito, dissented, arguing that the DTA should be interpreted
to preclude the Court’s review.
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51 See 415 F.3d  at 39 (citing Johnson v. Eisentrager, 339 U.S. 763, 789, n. 14).
52 Hamdan, slip op. at 63.
53 GPW art. 3 § 1(d).  The identical provision is included in each of the four Geneva
Conventions and applies to any “conflict not of an international character.”  The majority
declined to accept the President’s interpretation of Common Article 3 as inapplicable to the
conflict with al Qaeda and interpreted the phrase “in contradistinction to a conflict between
nations,” which the Geneva Conventions designate a “conflict of international character”.
Hamdan, slip op. at 67.
Presidential Authority.  With respect to the authority to create the military
commissions, the Court held that any power to create them must flow from the
Constitution and must be among those “powers granted jointly to the President and
Congress in time of war.”47  It disagreed with the government’s position that
Congress had authorized the commissions either when it passed the Authorization to
Use Military Force (AUMF)48 or the DTA.  Although the Court assumed that the
AUMF activated the President’s war powers, it did not view the AUMF as expanding
the President’s powers beyond the authorization set forth in the UCMJ.  The Court
also noted that the DTA, while recognizing the existence of military commissions,
does not specifically authorize them.  At most, these statutes  “acknowledge a general
Presidential authority to convene military commissions in circumstances where
justified under the ‘Constitution and laws,’ including the law of war.”49  
The Geneva Conventions and the Law of War.  The habeas corpus
statute permits those detained under U.S. authority to challenge their detention on the
basis that it violates any statute, the Constitution, or a treaty.50  The D.C. Circuit
nevertheless held that the Geneva Conventions are never enforceable in federal
courts.51  The Supreme Court disagreed, but found the Conventions were applicable
as incorporated by UCMJ Article 21, because “compliance with the law of war is the
condition upon which the authority set forth in Article 21 is granted.”52  In response
to the alternative holding by the court below that Hamdan, as a putative member of
al Qaeda, was not entitled to any of the protections accorded by the Geneva
Conventions, the Court concluded that Common Article 3 of the Geneva
Conventions applies even to members of al Qaeda, according to them a minimum
baseline of protections, including protection from the “passing of sentences and the
carrying out of executions without previous judgment pronounced by a regularly
constituted court, affording all the judicial guarantees which are recognized as
indispensable by civilized peoples.”53  
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While recognizing that Common Article 3 “obviously tolerates a great degree
of flexibility in trying individuals captured during armed conflict,” and that “its
requirements are general ones, crafted to accommodate a wide variety of legal
systems,” the Court found that the military commissions under M.C.O. No. 1 do not
meet these criteria.  In particular, the military commissions are not “regularly
constituted” because they deviate too far, in the Court’s view, from the rules that
apply to courts-martial, without a satisfactory explanation of the need for such
deviation.54  Justice Alito, joined by Justices Scalia and Thomas, dissented, arguing
that the Court is bound to defer to the President’s plausible interpretation of the treaty
language.
Analysis.  While the Hamdan Court declared the military commissions as
currently constituted to be “illegal,” it left open the possibility that changes to the
military commission rules could cure any defects by bringing them within the law of
war and conformity with the UCMJ, or by asking Congress to authorize or craft rules
tailored to the Global War on Terrorism (GWOT).  The Court did not resolve the
extent to which the detainees, as aliens held outside of U.S. territory, have
constitutional rights enforceable in federal court.  If Congress wishes to exempt the
commissions from compliance with treaty obligations, the Court may require it to do
so clearly.  
The decision may affect the treatment of detainees outside of their criminal
trials; for example, in interrogations for intelligence purposes.  Common Article 3
of the Geneva Conventions mandates that all persons taking no active part in
hostilities, including those who have laid down their arms or been incapacitated by
capture or injury, are to be treated humanely and protected from “violence to life and
person,” torture, and “outrages upon personal dignity, in particular, humiliating and
degrading treatment.”  Insofar as these protections are incorporated in the UCMJ and
other laws, it would seem the Court is ready to interpret and adjudicate them, to the
extent it retains jurisdiction to do so.  It is not clear how the Court views the scope
of the GWOT, however, because its decisions on the merits have been limited to
cases arising out of hostilities in Afghanistan.
The opinion reaffirms the holding in Rasul v. Bush55 that the GWOT does not
provide the President a “blank check,” and, by finding in favor of a noncitizen held
overseas, seems to have expanded the Hamdi comment that 
Whatever power the United States Constitution envisions for the Executive in its
exchanges with other nations or with enemy organizations in times of conflict,
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61 Section 1403 of P.L. 109-163. See CRS Report RS22312, Interrogation of Detainees:
Overview of the McCain Amendment, by Michael John Garcia.
it most assuredly envisions a role for all three branches when individual liberties
are at stake.56
The dissenting views also relied in good measure on actions taken by Congress,
seemingly repudiating the view expressed earlier by the Executive that any efforts by
Congress to legislate with respect to persons captured, detained, and possibly tried
in connection with the GWOT would be an unconstitutional intrusion into powers
held exclusively by the President.57  Expressly or implicitly, all eight participating
Justices applied the framework set forth by Justice Jackson in his famous
concurrence in the Steel Seizures case,58 which accords greater deference to the
President in cases involving national security where he acts with express
congressional authority than when he acts alone.  The differing views among the
Justices seem to have been a function of their interpretation of the AUMF and other
acts of Congress as condoning or limiting executive actions.59  The proposed bills for
authorizing military commissions would likely resolve many issues regarding the
scope of authority the President may exercise; however, the constitutionality of the
various measures remains to be resolved, assuming the courts retain jurisdiction to
resolve them.
Detainee Treatment Act of 2005 (DTA)
The Detainee Treatment Act of 2005 (DTA), passed after the Court’s decision
in Rasul, requires uniform standards for interrogation of persons in the custody of the
Department of Defense,60 and expressly bans cruel, inhuman, or degrading treatment
of detainees in the custody of any U.S. agency.61  The prohibited treatment is defined
as that which would violate the Fifth, Eighth, and Fourteenth Amendments to the
U.S. Constitution, as the Senate has interpreted “cruel, inhuman, or degrading”
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did not know that the practices were unlawful and a person of ordinary sense and
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65  See Eric Schmitt, Exception Sought in Detainee Abuse Ban, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 25, 2005,
at 16. 
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Nov. 14, 2005).
67 The amendment refers to both the Combatant Status Review Tribunals (“CSRTs”), the
initial administrative procedure to confirm the detainees’ status as enemy combatants, and
the Administrative Review Boards, which were established to provide annual review that
the detainees’ continued detention is warranted.
treatment banned by the U.N. Convention Against Torture.62  The provision does not
create a cause of action for detainees to ask a court for relief based on inconsistent
treatment, and it divests the courts of jurisdiction to hear challenges by those detained
at Guantanamo Bay based on their treatment or living conditions.63   It also provides
a legal defense to U.S. officers and agents who may be sued or prosecuted based on
their treatment or interrogation of detainees.64 This language appears to have been
added as a compromise because the Administration reportedly sought to have the
Central Intelligence Agency excepted from the prohibition on cruel, inhuman and
degrading treatment on the grounds that the President needs “maximum flexibility
in dealing with the global war on terrorism.” 65
The DTA also includes a modified version of the Graham Amendment (S.Amdt.
2516 to S. 1042, “the Graham-Levin Amendment”),66 which requires the Defense
Department to submit to the Armed Services and Judiciary Committees the
procedural rules for determining detainees’ status.67 The amendment neither
authorizes nor requires a formal status determination, but it does require that certain
congressional committees be notified 30 days prior to the implementation of any
changes to the rules.  As initially adopted by the Senate, the amendment would have
required these procedural rules to preclude evidence determined by the board or
tribunal to have been obtained by undue coercion, however, the conferees modified
the language so that the tribunal or board must assess, “to the extent practicable...
whether any statement derived from or relating to such detainee was obtained as a
result of coercion” and “the probative value, if any, of any such statement.”
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Press Release, Department of Defense, Navy Secretary to Oversee Enemy Combatant Admin
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nr20040623-0932.html](last visited Nov. 12, 2005).
72 See Memorandum, Secretary of the Navy, Implementation of Combatant Status Review
Tribunal Procedures for Enemy Combatants detained at Guantanamo Bay Naval Station,
Cuba, July 29, 2004, available at [http://www.defenselink.mil/news/Jul2004/d20040730
comb.pdf](last visited Nov. 12, 2005).
The Graham-Levin Amendment also eliminates the federal courts’ statutory
jurisdiction over habeas claims by aliens detained at Guantanamo Bay, but provides
for limited appeals of status determinations made pursuant to the DoD procedures for
Combatant Status Review Tribunals (CSRTs).68  The extent to which it applies to
habeas corpus claims pending on the day of enactment was not fully resolved by the
Supreme Court, and remains at issue detainee cases in the D.C. Circuit. The D.C.
Circuit Court of Appeals has exclusive jurisdiction to hear appeals of any status
determination made by a “Designated Civilian Official,” but the review is limited to
a consideration of whether the determination was made consistently with applicable
DoD procedures, including whether it is supported by the preponderance of the
evidence, but allowing a rebuttable presumption in favor of the government.  The
procedural rule regarding the use of evidence obtained through undue coercion
applies prospectively only, so that detainees who have already been determined by
CSRTs to be enemy combatants may not base an appeal on the failure to comply with
that procedure.  Detainees may also appeal status determinations on the basis that, “to
the extent the Constitution and laws of the United States are applicable, whether the
use of such standards and procedures to make the determination is consistent with the
Constitution and laws of the United States.”  Jurisdiction ceases if the detainee is
transferred from DoD custody.
The DTA does not elaborate on the role of the “Designated Civilian Official”
whose decision may be appealed.  As the CSRTs were initially established,69 the final
approval of CSRT decisions was the responsibility of the convening authority,70 and
there was no mention of a “designated civilian official,” although this might be a
reference to the role of the Secretary of the Navy, to whom the order establishing
CSRTs was addressed.71  The procedures established by Secretary England refer to
the position of Director, CSRT, who appears to be the convening authority for the
tribunals.72  At any rate, it does not appear that the Graham-Levin Amendment would
give the D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals jurisdiction to review CSRT determinations
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that have not been made or approved by a civilian official who had been appointed
with the advice and consent of the Senate. 
The DTA also provides for an appeal to the Court of Appeals for the District of
Columbia Circuit of final sentences rendered by a military commission.  The court
would be required to review capital cases or cases in which the alien was sentenced
to a term of imprisonment for 10 years or more, but could hear other cases at its
discretion.  The scope of review is limited to considering whether the decision
applied the correct standards consistent with Military Commission Order No. 1
(implementing the President’s Military Order)  and whether those standards are
consistent with the Constitution and laws of the United States, to the extent they are
applicable.  The  amendment does not contain a provision for interlocutory appeals
of military commission procedures.
Proposed Amendments to the Detainee Treatment
Act
Several bills have been introduced that would provide the President with
specific authority and guidelines to establish military commissions for the trial of
unlawful enemy combatants.73  The Bush Administration has presented to Congress
a proposal to be cited as the “Military Commissions Act of 2006.”  Senator Frist
introduced very similar legislation, the “Bringing Terrorists to Justice Act of 2006,”
as S. 3861 and as title I of S. 3886, the “Terrorist Tracking, Identification, and
Prosecution Act of 2006.”  The Senate Armed Services Committee reported
favorably a bill called the “Military Commissions Act of 2006” (S. 3901), which is
in many respects similar to the Administration’s proposal, but varies with respect to
jurisdiction and some rules of evidence.  The House Armed Services Committee
approved H.R. 6054, also called the “Military Commissions Act of 2006,” which
closely tracks the Administration’s proposal.  After reaching an agreement with the
White House with respect to several provisions in S. 3901, Senator McCain
introduced S. 3930, also entitled the “Military Commissions Act of 2006.”
Representative Hunter subsequently introduced a modified version of H.R. 6054 as
H.R. 6166.
These bills also address the appellate procedures and issues of collateral review
addressed by the Detainee Treatment Act. For instance, under S. 3901,74 the United
States Court of Appeals for the Armed Forces (CAAF) would have exclusive
jurisdiction to determine the final validity of any judgment rendered by a military
commission, and the Supreme Court of the United States would review by writ of
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79 S. 3861, § 5; S. 3886, § 105.
80 The question of whether such provisions are constitutional under the Confrontation
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generally CRS Report RL31600, The Department of Defense Rules for Military
Commissions: Analysis of Procedural Rules and Comparison with Proposed Legislation and
the Uniform Code of Military Justice 26 (2006).
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certiorari a final judgment of that court.75  The bill would also amend the DTA to
provide that its review provisions would be the exclusive remedy for all aliens
detained as enemy combatants, not just those housed at Guantanamo Bay, Cuba.76
Neither the statute nor the bills contains language requiring that all detainees undergo
a CSRT or a military tribunal in order to continue to be confined.  Thus, any aliens
detained outside of Guantanamo Bay might be effectively denied access to U.S.
courts.
As with S. 3901, S. 386177 and S. 388678 would provide the  President with
specific authority and guidelines to establish military commissions for the trial of
alien unlawful enemy combatants, including detainees not held at Guantanamo Bay.
In contrast to S. 3901, appeals from a military commission would go to the United
States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit.79  These bills also
provide that the Court of Appeals may consider classified information submitted in
camera and ex parte in making any determination under this section.80  
H.R. 605481 establishes procedures for military commissions to try alleged
unlawful combatants held outside the United States, and also provides for review by
the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit.82 This bill
differs in that the Court of Appeals review of decisions of a military commission may
only concern matters of law, not fact.83  H.R. 6166 provides for the same appellate
review in the D.C. Circuit, but it expressly mentions not only the Constitution of the
United States but also its laws, as within the scope of appellate review.
All of the bills contain provisions for revoking all U.S. courts’ jurisdiction to
hear habeas corpus petitions by aliens in U.S. custody as enemy combatants.  Section
5 of S. 3861 and H.R. 6054, and § 105 of S. 3886, would replace 28 U.S.C.
§ 2241(e), the habeas provision added by the DTA, with language providing that 
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no court, justice, or judge shall have jurisdiction to hear or consider any claim
or cause of action, including an application for a writ of habeas corpus, pending
on or filed after the date of ... enactment ... against the United States or its agents,
brought by or on behalf of any alien detained by the United States as an unlawful
enemy combatant, relating to any aspect of the alien’s detention, transfer,
treatment, or conditions of confinement.
Under these three bills, the D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals would retain jurisdiction
to hear reviews of CSRT determinations and final judgments of military
commissions.  In the event a detainee were to challenge a CSRT determination, the
Department of Defense would be permitted to conduct a new one, which would seem
to render the determination non-final and to strip the court of jurisdiction over the
case.  This provision would cover aliens detained as unlawful enemy combatants
whether they are confined overseas or in the United States.  
H.R. 6166 contains similar language in § 7, which provides that
No court, justice, or judge shall have jurisdiction to hear or consider an
application for a writ of habeas corpus filed by or on behalf of an alien detained
by the United States who has been determined by the United States to have been
properly detained as an enemy combatant or is awaiting such determination.
It further excludes courts from hearing any cause of action, other than those provided
in the DTA, with respect to “an alien who is or was detained by the United States and
has been determined by the United States to have been properly detained as an enemy
combatant or is awaiting such determination.”  This provision would disallow actions
in court by alien lawful combatants but might permit actions by aliens who are found
not to be enemy combatants by a CSRT.  There is no apparent limit to the amount of
time a detainee could spend awaiting a determination as to combatant status. 
Section 6 of S. 3901 would also replace subsection (e) of 28 U.S.C. § 2241, but
removes habeas corpus jurisdiction with respect to aliens detained outside the United
States who are either in U.S. custody or have been determined to be properly detained
as enemy combatants.   It would also remove jurisdiction from all courts to hear or
consider any other action against the United States or its agents relating to any aspect
of the detention, treatment, or trial of (1) an alien in U.S. custody overseas or (2) an
alien detained overseas, having been determined by the United States to be properly
detained as an enemy combatant.  The latter definition would apply to persons
determined to be entitled to prisoner-of-war status; the former would seem to include
aliens detained by the United States overseas for reasons apart from any alleged
participation in hostilities.
A more recent bill, S. 3930,84 also called the “Miliary Commissions Act of
2006,” was drafted as result of a compromise between key Senators and the
administration.  S. 3930 incorporates many of the provisions of the bills specified
above, in that it would provide the President with specific authority and guidelines
to establish military commissions.  As with S. 3861 and S. 3886 (but in contrast with
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S. 3901), the bill would provide that appeals from a military commission would go
to the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit.85  
S. 3930 does not provide, however, that the Court of Appeals may consider
classified information submitted in camera and ex parte in making a determination
under this section.  Nor does the bill limit the Court of Appeals to a review of
decisions of law, as does H.R. 6054.  As with the bills discussed above, however,
S. 3930 would amend the DTA to provide that its review provisions would be the
exclusive remedy for all aliens detained as enemy combatants, not just those housed
at Guantanamo Bay, Cuba.86  
S. 3930, like the prior bills, would replace 28 U.S.C. § 2241(e) with language
preventing any court (including  the court of appeals) from hearing habeas petitions
against the United States from any alien detained by the United States as an unlawful
enemy combatant, as regards any aspect of the alien’s detention, transfer, treatment,
or conditions of confinement.87  As with the other bills, only challenges to CSRT
determinations and final judgments of military commissions would be permitted.  As
with S. 3901, S. 3930 would also remove habeas corpus jurisdiction with respect to
aliens detained outside the United States who either are in U.S. custody or have been
determined to be properly detained as an enemy combatant.   
Constitutional Considerations
The Hamdan Court interpreted the DTA provision revoking the privilege of
habeas corpus as inapplicable to the case before it.  Because the petitioner was not
challenging a final decision of a military commission, the Court reasoned that the
DTA provision revoking jurisdiction over pending cases involving such decisions did
not apply.  The Court did not address the effect of the DTA on cases that were
pending at the time of enactment and that would have been covered under the DTA’s
provisions regarding final review of Combatant Status Review Tribunals.  Four bills
presently under consideration in the 109th Congress would amend the DTA
specifically to revoke habeas corpus jurisdiction over all cases involving aliens
detained as enemy combatants or aliens detained overseas.  It seems likely that the
courts will have occasion to address whether the DTA, as it currently applies or as
amended by any proposed legislation, violates the Constitution’s Suspension Clause
(article I, § 9, cl. 2) or exceeds Congress’s authority to regulate the jurisdiction of
federal courts. 
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The Suspension of Habeas Corpus  
The Writ of Habeas Corpus (ad subjiciendum), also known as the Great Writ,
has its origin in Fourteenth Century England.88  It provides the means for those
detained by the government to ask a court to order their warden to explain the legal
authority for their detention.  In the early days of the Republic, its primary use was
to challenge executive detention without trial or bail, or pursuant to a ruling by a
court without jurisdiction, but the writ has expanded over the years to include a
variety of collateral challenges to convictions or sentences based on alleged
violations of fundamental constitutional rights.89  A court reviewing a petition for
habeas corpus does not determine the guilt or innocence of the petitioner; rather, it
tests the legality of the detention and the custodian’s authority to detain.  If the
detention is not supported by law, the detainee is to be released.90  Minor
irregularities in trial procedures that do not amount to violations of fundamental
constitutional rights are generally to be addressed on direct appeal.91  
Given the emphasis the Rasul Court placed on the distinction between the
statutory and constitutional entitlement to habeas corpus, it would seem reasonable
to suppose that Congress might easily revoke by statute what it had earlier granted
without offending either the Court or the Constitution.  However, the special status
accorded the Writ by the Suspension Clause of the Constitution complicates matters.
Article I, § 9, cl. 2, provides: “The Privilege of the Writ of Habeas Corpus shall
not be suspended, unless when in Cases of Rebellion or Invasion the public Safety
may require it.”  If the DTA amounts to a suspension of the writ of habeas corpus,
the Supreme Court could take up the question of whether a “case of rebellion or
invasion” exists and whether the federal courts’ consideration of the detainees’
petitions actually endangers the public safety to such a degree that suspension of the
Writ is warranted.  If, on the other hand, the amendment represents the mere
regulation of procedures for seeking relief, or eliminates a statutory right not
guaranteed by the Constitution, then the Supreme Court may rule itself ineligible to
review detainee cases.  
While the federal courts’ power to review petitions under habeas corpus has
historically relied on statute,92 it has been explained that the Constitution obligates
Congress to  provide “efficient means by which [the Writ] should receive life and
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activity.”93  The Court presumes that “the Suspension Clause of the Constitution
refers to the writ as it exists today, rather than as it existed in 1789.”94 Consequently,
the Court may be unwilling to permit Congress to eliminate habeas rights it
previously granted, at least to the extent that no other avenue of relief is available.95
In particular, even if Congress is found to have suspended the Writ, the Court may
be reticent to give up the authority of the judicial branch to decide whether the
suspension applies to a particular case.96
Congress’s authority to control the courts’ jurisdiction over habeas cases was
tested in the aftermath of the Civil War.  As part of its Reconstruction efforts,
Congress broadened the scope of the Writ to provide for review of convictions of
state courts and to give the Supreme Court appellate jurisdiction in habeas corpus
cases.  Prior to that time, the Supreme Court could review habeas decisions only by
issuing an original writ of habeas corpus combined with certiorari.  However, when
the Court’s new appellate review appeared to threaten the legitimacy of much of the
Reconstruction legislation, including a statute that allowed military trials of civilians
in formerly Confederate states, Congress hastily revoked the Supreme Court’s
appellate jurisdiction over habeas cases. The Supreme Court upheld Congress’s
authority to revoke its appellate jurisdiction, even though it had already heard
arguments in the case of McCardle, a civilian held for trial by a military commission
in Mississippi.  Upon dismissing McCardle’s appeal, however, the Court remarked:
Counsel seem to have supposed, if effect be given to the repealing act in
question, that the whole appellate power of the court, in cases of habeas corpus,
is denied. But this is an error. The act of 1868 does not except from that
jurisdiction any cases but appeals from Circuit Courts under the act of 1867. It
does not affect the jurisdiction which was previously exercised.97
Shortly after the McCardle case, the Supreme Court, in agreeing to review the
case of another civilian held by military authority, confirmed that it could indeed
continue to issue original writs of habeas corpus and certiorari notwithstanding the
repeal of the 1867 law.98  Repeal of those parts of the Judiciary Act of 1789 that
conferred power on the Supreme Court to review habeas cases was not to be found
by implication.  Congress made no effort to further diminish the Court’s habeas
jurisdiction, leaving open the question whether such an effort would amount to a
violation of the Suspension Clause.  
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The Supreme Court had an opportunity to revisit the question after Congress in
1996 passed the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act (AEDPA), part of
which restricted successive habeas petitions by prisoners in state custody.  Until
1867, prisoners held pursuant to convictions in state courts were not eligible to seek
federal habeas relief,99 yet it remains unclear whether Congress is free to revoke such
jurisdiction without effecting a suspension of the Writ.  In Felker v. Turpin,100 the
Supreme Court followed its holding in ex parte Yerger to interpret a section of the
AEDPA preventing its review of orders denying leave to file a second habeas
petition as leaving intact the Supreme Court’s power to consider original petitions
for habeas relief, apparently avoiding an unconstitutional “suspension” of the Writ,
or at least avoiding the need for the Court to determine whether the Suspension
Clause was in fact implicated. 
The DTA appears to be less equivocal with respect to the rights of a narrowly
defined class of persons to petition for habeas relief: no jurisdiction, whether original
or appellate, will lie in federal court for petitions on behalf of aliens detained by the
military at Guantanamo Bay.  As the Act is implemented, the Court may find it
necessary to resolve the question of the Suspension Clause’s effect on Congress’s
authority to regulate the jurisdiction of federal courts, particularly the Supreme Court.
If legislation is enacted to deny the rights of all aliens in U.S. custody, whether held
abroad or within the United States, to petition for habeas corpus, it may become
necessary to clarify a question the Court did not resolve in Rasul, namely, whether
that decision extended beyond Guantanamo Bay to other U.S. prisons abroad where
the United States does not exercise exclusive jurisdiction and control.101 
Limiting Court Jurisdiction
At the brink of the Suspension Clause issue is the question whether the relief
available under habeas may be available under other procedures. In addition, the
question arises as to whether the DTA, by limiting certain procedural routes to
challenge the Guantanamo detainees’ detention and treatment, would limit the
vindication of constitutional rights and unconstitutionally usurp the role of the federal
courts. A definitive interpretation of the effect of the DTA is difficult, however, since
many of the constitutional and procedural issues raised by the detentions at
Guantanamo remain unresolved.
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Generally, it would appear that there are two categories of cases that are likely
to be brought by detainees at Guantanamo: cases challenging the fact or length of a
detainee’s incarceration, and cases challenging the conditions under which a detainee
is being held.  While there may be some overlap, these two categories may involve
different procedural routes and the application of different constitutional rights.
The Fact and Length of Detention.  As noted above, the Supreme Court
in Rasul found that the Guantanamo detainees had a statutory right to petition a
federal district court for a writ of habeas corpus102 based on claims that they are held
“in custody in violation of the Constitution or laws or treaties of the United States.”103
In general, writs of habeas corpus are available as a means of challenging the fact or
length of a detention or incarceration.104 The DTA appears intended to prohibit
detainees from utilizing this particular statutory procedure to bring cases into court.105
Thus, the question arises as to whether there are alternate procedural routes by
which detainees could bring suits challenging the fact or length of their detention.
Under the DTA, the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia
Circuit has exclusive jurisdiction to determine the validity of decisions by a CSRT
that a detainee is an enemy combatant and to review final decisions of military
commissions convicting detainees of violations of the law of war.  The D.C.
Circuit’s jurisdiction does include constitutional review of whether the standards and
procedures utilized in the military proceedings below were consistent with the
Constitution and laws of the United States.  Proposed legislation may further limit
the scope of court review.  With respect to the final decisions of military
commissions, H.R. 6064 would limit review to a consideration of whether the
decision was consistent with standards and procedures it sets, and “to the extent
applicable, the Constitution.”  (proposed 10 U.S.C. § 950g).  S. 3901 would limit
review of final military commission decisions to the Court of Appeals for the Armed
Forces (CAAF), under the limitations set forth in section 1005(e)(3) of the DTA.  
Conditions of Detention.  A variety of challenges have been raised by
detainees in Guantanamo regarding conditions of their detention, including such
issues as whether prisoners can be held in solitary confinement106 when they can be
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F.3d 1476, 1479 (D.C. Cir. 1995).
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transferred,107 or whether they can have contact with relatives.108 Although some of
these were brought as habeas corpus cases,109 Guantanamo detainees have also
sought relief from the courts using the All Writs Act,110 principally to prevent their
transfer to other countries without notice,111 but for other reasons too.112  Use of the
All Writs Act by a court is an extraordinary remedy, generally not invoked if there
is an alternative remedy available.113 
Prisoners in federal prison, acting under a district court’s general jurisdiction to
consider claims arising under the Constitution,114 have also sought writs of
mandamus115 to obtain changes in prison conditions.116 These writs, which are
directed against government officials, have been used to require those officials to act
in compliance with constitutional requirements. Although these challenges are often
denied on the merits or on procedural grounds, cases have been brought based on the
First Amendment,117 Sixth Amendment,118 Eighth Amendment119 and various other
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124 403 U.S. 388 (1971).
125  Carlson v. Green, 446 U.S. 14 (1980)(Court allowed a Bivens action against federal
prison officials for failing to provide adequate medical treatment).
126 In Carlson, the Supreme Court held that a Bivens-type action cannot be brought in
situation: where defendants (1) demonstrate special factors counseling hesitation in the
absence of affirmative action by Congress, or (2) show that Congress has provided a
sufficient alternate remedy.
grounds.120 To the extent that these alternates writs are not cut off by the DTA,121 they
might offer an alternative route to challenge conditions of detention.122  
Finally, it is possible that the detainees in Guantanamo could have attempted to
bring a Bivens action for damages against relevant government officials.123  In Bivens
v. Six Unknown Federal Narcotics Agents,124 the Supreme Court has held that suits
can be brought against federal government officials directly under the Constitution
for violations of the Fourth Amendment. The Court has also explicitly provided that
such suits are available to federal prisoners alleging cruel and unusual punishment
in violation of the Eighth Amendment.125  Again, this remedy is most likely to be
available where Congress has not provided an adequate remedy for constitutional
violations.126 However, it should be noted that the number of successful Bivens
actions appears to be relatively small, and state actors in certain roles, such as federal
agency enforcement officials, may have absolute immunity from damage suits.
Statements regarding the DTA, however, indicate that its sponsors anticipated
that the Act would limit the ability of detainees to seek redress regarding the
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conditions of their detention.127  The language of the DTA itself appears to cut off all
court jurisdiction for detainees except for limited review of the fact of detention.128
The DTA itself appears to provide no opportunity for a court to review issues related
to detention, thus arguably banning challenges to conditions of detention such as
cases based on the Eighth Amendment ban on cruel and unusual punishment.
Congressional Authority Over Federal Courts
As noted, sponsors of the DTA have indicated that the intent of the language
which passed the Senate was, in part, to limit the ability of detainees to bring cases
challenging the conditions of their detention. To the extent that such challenges are
based on constitutional considerations, however, the question arises as to whether
Congress can impose such limitations. If it is determined that no procedure is
available to vindicate constitutional rights, then it might be argued that the
Congress’s limitation on the use of habeas corpus or other avenues of redress by the
detainees is an unconstitutional limitation. 
The Constitution contains few requirements regarding the jurisdiction of the
federal courts. Article III, Section 1, of the Constitution provides that 
The judicial Power of the United States, shall be vested in one supreme Court,
and in such inferior Courts as the Congress may from time to time ordain and
establish.129 The Judges, both of the supreme and inferior Courts, shall hold their
Offices during good Behaviour, and shall, at stated Times, receive for their
Services, a Compensation, which shall not be diminished during their
Continuance in Office.
Although Article III provides for a Supreme Court headed by the Chief Justice
of the United States,130 nothing else about its structure and its operation is specified,
so the size and composition of the Court, as well as the specifics, if any, of the lower
federal courts, is left to Congress.131 Utilizing its power to establish inferior courts,
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Congress has also created the United States district courts,132 the courts of appeals for
the thirteen circuits,133 and other federal courts.134
On its face, there is no limit on the power of Congress to make exceptions to
and regulate the Supreme Court’s appellate jurisdiction, to create inferior federal
courts and to specify their jurisdiction. However, that is true of the Constitution’s
other grants of legislative authority in Article I and elsewhere, which do not prevent
the application of other constitutional principles to those powers. “[T]he Constitution
is filled with provisions that grant Congress or the States specific power to legislate
in certain areas,” Justice Black wrote for the Court in a different context, but “these
granted powers are always subject to the limitations that they may not be exercised
in a way that violates other specific provisions of the Constitution.”135 Justice Harlan
seems to have had the same thought in mind when he said that, with respect to
Congress’s power over jurisdiction of the federal courts, “what such exceptions and
regulations should be it is for Congress, in its wisdom, to establish, having of course
due regard to all the Constitution.”136
Thus, it is clear that while Congress has significant authority over administration
of the judicial system, it may not exercise its authority over the courts in a way that
violates constitutional rights such as the Fifth Amendment due process clause or
precepts of equal protection.  For instance, Congress could not limit access to the
judicial system based on race or ethnicity.137 Nor, without amendment of the
Constitution, could Congress provide that the courts may take property while denying
a right to compensation under the takings clause.138  In general, the mere fact
Congress is exercising its authority over the courts does not serve to insulate such
legislation from constitutional scrutiny. 
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Separation of Powers Issues
It is also clear that Congress may not exercise its authority over the courts in a
way that violates precepts of separation of powers. The doctrine of separation of
powers is not found in the text of the Constitution, but has been discerned by courts,
scholars, and others in the allocation of power in the first three Articles; that is, the
“legislative power” is vested in Congress, the “executive power” is vested in the
President, and the “judicial power” is vested in the Supreme Court and the inferior
federal courts.  That interpretation is also consistent with the speeches and writings
of the framers. Beginning with Buckley v. Valeo,139 the Supreme Court has
reemphasized separation of powers as a vital element in American federal
government.140
The federal courts have long held that Congress may not act to denigrate the
authority of the judicial branch. In the 1782 decision in Hayburn’s Case,141 several
Justices objected to a congressional enactment that authorized the federal courts to
hear claims for disability pensions for veterans. The courts were to certify their
decisions to the Secretary of War, who was authorized either to award each pension
or to refuse it if he determined the award was an “imposition or mistaken.” The
Justices on circuit contended that the law was unconstitutional because the judicial
power was committed to a separate department and because the subjecting of a
court’s opinion to revision or control by an officer of the executive or the legislative
branch was not authorized by the Constitution. Congress thereupon repealed the
objectionable features of the statute.142  More recently, the doctrine of separation of
powers has been applied to prevent Congress from vesting jurisdiction over
common-law bankruptcy claims in non-Article III courts.143
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Allocation of court jurisdiction by Congress is complicated by the presence of
state court systems that can and in some cases do hold concurrent jurisdiction over
cases involving questions of federal statutory and constitutional law. Thus, the power
of Congress over the federal courts is really the power to determine how federal cases
are to be allocated among state courts, federal inferior courts, and the United States
Supreme Court. Congress has significant authority to determine which of these
various courts will adjudicate such cases, and the method by which this will occur.
For most purposes, the exercise of this power is relatively noncontroversial.
As regards the DTA, however, there appears to be little chance of state courts
exercising jurisdiction over the detainees in Guantanamo Bay.144 Consequently, the
issue here appears to be, not where the cases of the Guantanamo detainees will be
heard, but whether such cases will be heard in any court, whether state or federal.
Although the Supreme Court has not specifically addressed the issue of the
withdrawal of jurisdiction from all courts to consider challenges to the actions of
government officials, it would seem likely that such restrictions would be
constitutionally suspect. 
Eliminating Federal Court Jurisdiction Where There Is No
State Court Review
A series of lower federal court decisions seem to indicate that in most cases,
some forum must be provided for the vindication of constitutional rights, whether in
federal or state courts. For instance, in 1946, a series of Supreme Court decisions145
under the Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938146 exposed employers to $5 billion
dollars in damages, and the United States itself was threatened with liability for over
$1.5 billion. Subsequently, Congress enacted the Portal to Portal Act of 1947,147
which limited the jurisdiction of any court, state or federal, to impose liability or
impose punishment with respect to such liabilities.  Although the act was upheld by
a series of federal district courts and courts of appeals, most of the courts disregarded
the purported jurisdictional limits, and decided the cases on the merits.
As one court noted, “while Congress has the undoubted power to give, withhold,
or restrict the jurisdiction of courts other than the Supreme Court, it must not exercise
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that power as to deprive any person of life, liberty, or property without due process
or just compensation. . . .”148  The Court has also construed other similar statutes
narrowly so as to avoid “serious constitutional questions” that would arise if no
judicial forum for a constitutional claim existed.149
The Supreme Court has not directly addressed whether there needs to be a
judicial forum to vindicate all constitutional rights. Justice Scalia has pointed out that
there are particular cases, such as political questions cases, where all constitutional
review is in effect precluded.150  Other commentators point to sovereign immunity
and the ability of the government to limit the remedies available to plaintiffs.151
However, the Court has, in cases involving particular rights, generally found a
requirement that effective judicial remedies be present. Thus, for instance, the Court
has held that the Constitution mandates the availability of effective remedies for
takings.152  These cases would seem to indicate a basis for the Court to find that
parties seeking to vindicate other particular rights must have a judicial forum for such
challenges.
Conclusion
The Administration’s policy of detaining wartime captives and suspected
terrorists at Guantanamo Bay Naval Station raises a host of novel legal questions
regarding, among other matters, the relative powers of the President and Congress
to fight terrorism. The DTA may be Congress’s first effort to impose limits on the
President’s conduct of the War on Terrorism and to prescribe a role for the courts.
The precise impact the Act will ultimately have, as implemented and possibly
amended, is difficult to predict.
